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oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/39212024-05-13T08:06:51Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Santos Martín, José Ignacio Poza, David J. Galán Ordax, José Manuel López Paredes, Adolfo 2016-02-04T10:45:16Z 2016-02-04T10:45:16Z 2012 1026-0226 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3921 10.1155/2012/482481 The topology of interactions has been proved very influential in the results of models based on learning and evolutionary game theory. This paper is aimed at investigating the effect of structures ranging from regular ring lattices to random networks, including small-world networks, in a model focused on property distribution norms. The model considers a fixed and finite population of agents who play the Nash bargaining game repeatedly. Our results show that regular networks promote the emergence of the equity norm, while less-structured networks make possible the appearance of fractious regimes. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the speed of adoption can also be affected by the network structure eng https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution 3.0 Unported Evolution of equity norms in small-world networks info:eu-repo/semantics/article