2026-04-28T21:57:59Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52032024-05-13T10:37:25Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
Sandholm, William H.
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Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
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Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
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500
0000-0003-1057-4465
2020-01-09T12:20:59Z
2020-01-09T12:20:59Z
2020-01
0022-0531
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature.
application/pdf
eng
Elsevier
Journal of Economic Theory. 2010. V. 185, 104957
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Evolutionary game dynamics
Best experienced payoff dynamics
Sampling dynamics
Dynamic stability
Economía
Gestión de empresas
Economics
Industrial management
Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
TEXT
Sandholm-jet_2020.pdf.txt
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oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/5203
2024-05-13 12:37:25.199
Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
bubrep@ubu.es
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