2026-05-12T03:50:35Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/71122022-11-03T01:05:36Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Izquierdo, Segismundo S. 4e3f9084-ce78-4483-84da-09c5ec53d481 600 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 299 600 2022-11-02T12:52:48Z 2022-11-02T12:52:48Z 2022-10 2164-6066 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112 10.3934/jdg.2021018 2164-6074 Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence. Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033), from “Junta de Castilla y León - Consejería de Educación” through BDNS 425389, from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX18-00182, PRX19/00113), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113), is gratefully acknowledged. application/pdf eng American Institute of Mathematical Sciences Journal of Dynamics and Games. 2022, V. 9, n. 4, p. 461-498 https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021018 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118906GB-I00/ES/INTERACCIONES DINAMICAS DISTRIBUIDAS: PROTOCOLOS BEST EXPERIENCED PAYOFF Y SEPARACION ENDOGENA info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/Junta de Castilla y León//BDNS 425389 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PRX18%2F00182 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICIU/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PRX19%2F00113 Evolutionary game dynamics Centipede game Backwards induction Cooperation Simulation Best experienced payoff dynamics Finite population Matemáticas Mathematics "Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Journal of Dynamics and Games 9 4 461 498 THUMBNAIL Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf.jpg Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf.jpg IM Thumbnail image/jpeg 3973 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7112/3/Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf.jpg 2ef21d7fad661e7345ae71711d5811e4 MD5 3 LICENSE license.txt license.txt text/plain; charset=utf-8 999 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7112/2/license.txt b295bcbce42e2caabeb0c623d3860c06 MD5 2 ORIGINAL Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf application/pdf 1992354 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7112/1/Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf 916fdfd1ac1e35fedb4710609330336d MD5 1 10259/7112 oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/7112 2022-11-03 02:05:36.804 Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos bubrep@ubu.es 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