<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-28T21:06:12Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/7467" metadataPrefix="oai_dc">https://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/7467</identifier><datestamp>2024-05-10T11:55:57Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_10259_7380</setSpec><setSpec>com_10259_5086</setSpec><setSpec>com_10259_2604</setSpec><setSpec>col_10259_7381</setSpec></header><metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
<dc:title>Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas</dc:title>
<dc:creator>Andrés, Pablo de</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>García Rodríguez, Íñigo</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Romero Merino, María Elena</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Stakeholder theory</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Spanish cajas</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Politicians</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Private benefits</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Political party identification</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Social identity theory</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Economía</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Política económica</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Economics</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Economic policy</dc:subject>
<dc:description>Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We&#xd;
use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether&#xd;
political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties,&#xd;
or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is&#xd;
associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors.&#xd;
Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the&#xd;
political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on&#xd;
the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of&#xd;
private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members.</dc:description>
<dc:description>This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2017-85356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid Research Project for Young Researchers (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefited from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3). The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions received from the four anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor, Constantinos N. Leonidou. The authors also thank the comments received from B. Arrunada, ˜ G. Natividad, A. Martín-Oliver, V. Salas-Fumas ´ and N. Suarez, ´ and the participants at the Wolpertinger Conference held in Santander and at the SANFI Workshop held in Palermo.</dc:description>
<dc:date>2023-02-28T11:18:08Z</dc:date>
<dc:date>2023-02-28T11:18:08Z</dc:date>
<dc:date>2022-05</dc:date>
<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
<dc:identifier>0148-2963</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7467</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:relation>Journal of Business Research. 2022, V. 144, p. 1272-1292</dc:relation>
<dc:relation>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096</dc:relation>
<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2017-85356-P/ES/VALOR, ESTRATEGIA FINANCIERA Y GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO/</dc:relation>
<dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CAM//SI3-PJI-2021-00276/</dc:relation>
<dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional</dc:rights>
<dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
<dc:publisher>Elsevier</dc:publisher>
</oai_dc:dc></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>