2026-04-28T08:15:14Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/74672024-05-10T11:55:57Zcom_10259_7380com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_7381

Andrés, Pablo de dba78faa-b89e-4636-81a5-41b501a6b686 600 García Rodríguez, Íñigo 215 600 0000-0003-2662-8018 Romero Merino, María Elena 675 600 0000-0003-0920-4950 Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos 676 600 0000-0002-2564-7017 2023-02-28T11:18:08Z 2023-02-28T11:18:08Z 2022-05 0148-2963 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7467 10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096 Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties, or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors. Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members. This study was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant ECO2017-85356), the UAM - Comunidad de Madrid Research Project for Young Researchers (SI3-PJI-2021-00276) and it benefited from the Professorship Excellence Program in accordance with the multi-year agreement signed by the Government of Madrid and the Autonomous University of Madrid (Line #3). The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions received from the four anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor, Constantinos N. Leonidou. The authors also thank the comments received from B. Arrunada, ˜ G. Natividad, A. Martín-Oliver, V. Salas-Fumas ´ and N. Suarez, ´ and the participants at the Wolpertinger Conference held in Santander and at the SANFI Workshop held in Palermo. application/pdf eng Elsevier Journal of Business Research. 2022, V. 144, p. 1272-1292 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2017-85356-P/ES/VALOR, ESTRATEGIA FINANCIERA Y GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO/ info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CAM//SI3-PJI-2021-00276/ Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Stakeholder theory Spanish cajas Politicians Private benefits Political party identification Social identity theory Economía Política económica Economics Economic policy Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Journal of Business Research 144 1272 1292 THUMBNAIL Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf.jpg Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf.jpg IM Thumbnail image/jpeg 5063 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7467/4/Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf.jpg ef4b776540fba09fbf7d232a24e63c63 MD5 4 LICENSE license.txt license.txt text/plain; charset=utf-8 1362 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7467/3/license.txt 5d013bfa6e473ff0db22cd82a4d71a70 MD5 3 CC-LICENSE license_rdf license_rdf application/rdf+xml; charset=utf-8 805 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7467/2/license_rdf 4460e5956bc1d1639be9ae6146a50347 MD5 2 ORIGINAL Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf application/pdf 874509 https://riubu.ubu.es/bitstream/10259/7467/1/Garcia-jbr_2022.pdf dda7ddb0f09e42fa462828fa492d526a MD5 1 10259/7467 oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/7467 2024-05-10 13:55:57.836 Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos bubrep@ubu.es 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