POPULIST'S VOTERS' PROFILES IN DIFFERENT ELECTORAL CALLS. LESSONS FROM SPAIN[1]

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INTRODUCTION

We live in a time of great change and uncertainty, in which societies are becoming increasingly polarised and institutions are proving less effective in responding to citizens' demands. In this political and social context, radical right-wing populist parties have taken advantage of a great opportunity to position themselves as indispensable partners of conservative governments, through effective communication strategies based on the appeal of a primary conception of politics (Prodobnick et al., 2019). One of the current challenges in Political Science is to analyse the reasons that have led to the electoral success of these formations (Prodobdnik et al., 2019; Durrheim et al., 2018; Staerklé and Green, 2018; Kishishita, 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Hameleers, 2018), and the real chances of these parties achieving continuity over time and being acceptable partners in government.

Moreover, the fact that in politically composite states there are different levels of administration and government makes it particularly relevant to check whether the profile of the electorate is similar in all cases or, depending on the electoral arenas, not. This differentiation across levels is the case of the Spanish electoral context and, specifically, in the analysis of Vox as a radical populist right-wing party. To this end, throughout the chapter, we will analyse whether there are differences in the electorate, depending on the electoral arena under study.

This chapter has six sections. The following section will provide a theoretical review of the most recent academic literature to define those variables of analysis that are of greatest interest in the study of the radical populist right. Subsequently, a brief exploratory analysis will be made of the presence of Vox as a new political actor, through a review of its electoral results. Next, Vox voter profiles will be established based on previous studies, and, in the following section, a logistic regression analysis will be

carried out. This will seek to test the electoral characteristics of Vox voters to identify the extent to which there is an 'average voter profile' for this party, regardless of the electoral arena in which it is competing. Finally, some brief conclusions will be drawn.

RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM

In recent years, we have witnessed a new phenomenon in Europe; the rise of populism. But what do we mean by populism?[2] This term is perhaps one of the most controversial to analyse, as it encompasses a wide variety of imprecise phenomena (Mudde, 2017). Populism is seen by Rivero (Chapter 2) as a parasitic ideology of democracy and as an endemism characteristic of democracy only. There are two basic assumptions in the populist understanding of democracy. The first one is that democracy is, literally, "the government in the name of the people". The second basic assumption of Populism as an ideology is that all societies are divided in two closed and antagonistic groups, the people, and the oligarchy.

The electoral success of radical right-wing populist formations is due to multiple factors, depending on social and political context, that have generated a variety of approaches: theories that talk about economic inequality (Rama and Cordero, 2018; Inglehart and Norris, 2019); those that focus on cultural reaction (Inglehart and Norris, 2016); and those that highlight identity conflict (De Lange and Mugge, 2015; Inglehart and Norris, 2019; De Cleen and Stavrakakis, 2017; Antón and Hernández-Carr, 2016).

In the case of Vox, Anduiza (2018) asks whether it is 'populist', as the content of its discourse poses difficulties in this regard[3]. However, he acknowledges that Vox has four fundamental characteristics that categorise this type of party and that, in addition, connect with three currents that explain its growth.

Vox is characterised, firstly, by insertion of the element of national unity as opposed to territorial dispersion, through focusing its discourse on the rejection of regionalist and peripheral nationalist formations. Secondly, their 'cultural reaction' is represented by a rejection of policies linked to equality - in areas such as feminism, equal marriage, and abortion. Thirdly, their criminalisation of 'the different' -the immigrant- is a discourse based on a marked nativism related to this same current. Lastly, Vox's discourse makes

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[2] Only the key elements of these types of parties are identified here, as this issue has been extensively covered in Section 1 of this book.

[3] In Chapter 10, a similar discussion can be found on whether the elements on populist discourse are present on VOX's speeches.

intensive use of aggressive language that denotes authoritarianism in both form and substance.

On the one hand, Ferrerira (2019) argues that Vox fulfils the conditions to be considered a radical right-wing party. However, the populist element is secondary in its discourse and programme, to the detriment of others such as nationalism[4]. It also differs from other European radical right parties in its clear neoliberal economic positioning, and in its conservative attitude towards moral issues.

On the other, Mendes and Dennison (2020) argue that their electoral success may be due to a political context that highlights issues such as immigration or the territorial organisation of the state, and even political disaffection. In addition to this explanatory factor, Vox's 'normalisation' and high profile in the media -in contrast to that obtained by other radical right-wing populist parties in Spain- is a determining factor in its growth.

In short, this review of recent studies confirms that Vox fits the prototype of the radical right-wing populist party that already exists in Europe. Thus, we construct our empirical measurement model on the basis of the concept of populism outlined at the beginning of this section, focusing on the explanatory variables that will be detailed in the section on the profile of the electorate and, subsequently, in the research methodology.

VOX AS A PARADIGM IN A MULTILEVEL ELECTORAL CONTEXT

It can be established that the context of the Great Recession (2007-2013[5]) has been the best scenario for the entrenchment of radical right-wing populist parties in a large part of Europe (Rama and Cordero, 2018). The austerity policies carried out by governments of all ideological stripes, due to the severe impact of the crisis on the economy, provoked a certain sense of disaffection among citizens, leading to the flourishing of movements that sought to delegitimise these policies (Antón and Hernández-Carr, 2016). This trend has explained the rise of some formations such as the National Front in France and Donald Trump's electoral success in the United States, which have been able to channel the anger of the popular and working classes most affected by the recession.

However, in the Spanish case, the strengthening and rise of the radical right-wing populist party VOX has not occurred in this context (Mendes and Dennison, 2020).

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[4] In this line, a similar conclusion drawn both in the case of VOX and Chega (in Portugal) in Chapter 10.
[5] Although the range of dates is between 2007 and 2009, it is worth noting that it was not until 2013 that the world economy began to show signs of recovery and, therefore, the end of the Great Recession.

Although its genesis does take place in the Great Recession, insofar as it was founded in 2013, it did not manage to capitalise on citizens' disenchantment with the austerity measures. This discontent, however, will be captured by two other newly created formations in Spain, *Podemos* -left-wing populist party- and, later, *Ciudadanos* -liberal party- (Ramiro and Gómez, 2017).

However, it will not be until the vote of no confidence that ousted the conservative government that VOX will reach historic highs in the electoral polls (Michavila, 2019). This capitalisation of the vote of discontent with the democratic system has its paradigm in the rise of movements of revolt against democracy (Zembylas, 2021) as in the case of Poland, Hungary or, more recently, with the event of the assault on the Capitol on 6 January 2021 in the United States. In this way, the effects of the Great Recession were not so relevant in the process of VOX's consolidation, with political disaffection being one of the main ingredients for the electoral success that was to come (Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana, 2019).

The December 2018 Andalusian regional elections marked the beginning of an electoral cycle highlighted by the entry of Vox representatives into the legislative chambers of different levels of government in Spain. These elections represented the end of the idea of 'Iberian exceptionality' (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), which saw these types of parties in Spain only achieve poor results compared to other parts of Europe. Subsequently, from 2018 to date, Vox has managed to have a presence in the European Parliament, Congress, Senate, 11 autonomous legislative bodies[6], the assemblies of the Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla and a multitude of municipalities.

As said in the introduction, studying Spain in the electoral cycle that has just ended is a unique opportunity to see, in a short space of time, how the profile of the Vox voter has changed. This party, has faced over 15 different elections in four different electoral arenas, which allows us to carry out a comparative analysis of the determining factors of political behaviour, which will be detailed in the next section.

A few months after the Andalusian elections, general elections were held in April 2019, in which the citizens of the Valencian Community were also called to the polls to

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[6] Vox has no representation in the autonomous communities of the Canary Islands, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia, La Rioja and Navarre.

elect their regional representatives. In both elections, Vox exceeded 10% of the vote and was the fifth political force in number of representatives. For its part, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) was the most voted-for party both in the Valencian Community and in Spain as a whole, but while in the former an agreement between left-wing parties led to the socialists retaining the presidency, at national level none of the candidates obtained sufficient support to form a government. This triggered a new election in November 2019, which was preceded by local, European and 12 regional elections in May of the same year.

With respect to the May 2019 elections, the PSOE was the most voted-for political force in the European and municipal elections, as well as in 10 of the 12 autonomous communities where elections were called. For its part, the Partido Popular (hereafter, PP) was able to form a government with Ciudadanos (hereafter, Cs) in Castilla y León, the Community of Madrid, and the Region of Murcia. In the latter two regions, as in Andalusia, Vox was key to the success of the regional government. These elections marked a setback in the electoral aspirations of Spain's radical right-wing populist formation which, despite the diversity of results, achieved only 6% of the vote in the European elections[7]. This setback was even more pronounced in the municipal elections, where, due to the party's weak territorial organisational structure, Vox failed to reach 4% of the vote in Spain as a whole.

The November 2019 General Election followed, where the PSOE managed to revalidate its majority and, this time, form a coalition government with Podemos, with the support of nationalist and minority parties in the investiture. But these elections also brought about major changes in the balance of power in the right-wing bloc: the collapse of Cs (which lost 47 seats and went from being the third force, in terms of the number of votes, to fifth), caused a sharp rise in both the total number of votes and the number of seats for the PP and Vox. The latter became the third largest political force in Parliament, with 52 seats and more than 15 per cent of the vote.

The first elections following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic were the Galician and Basque regional elections. In Galicia, the PP revalidated its absolute majority, ensuring that Vox did not obtain representation. In the Basque Country, the Basque

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[7] European elections have been described by several authors as 'second order elections', characterised by: lower voter turnout, better electoral prospects for small and new political parties, a higher percentage of invalid votes and poor electoral outcomes for governing parties (Reif and Schmitt, 1980: 9).

Nationalist Party (PNV) was once again the most voted-for party and Vox obtained only one member of parliament Finally, the electoral cycle closed with the February 2021 regional elections in Catalonia, and the early elections in the Community of Madrid, in May 2021. In the former, the socialists were the most voted-for party, but the Catalan nationalist parties once again agreed to form a government. Vox obtained over 7.5% of the vote; winning 11 seats. In the Community of Madrid, the PP gained an ample majority, with 65 out of 136 elected members of parliament. Despite this, the PP needed the support of Vox representatives, with 13 seats and over 9% of the vote, to be able to preside over the Community.

After verifying the electoral evolution of this party and, above all, its growing weight due to its electoral impact, it is now time to turn to studies on its electorate. This will help us identify key variables to enable comparison between electoral arenas.

VOX VOTERS' PROFILE

In the case of radical right-wing populist parties, Rama and Cordero (2018) observe that, in countries less affected by the economic crisis, these parties' voters tend to be older, less educated and belong to lower social classes, while in the most affected countries they tend to be young and with a higher level of education. Antón and Hernández-Carr (2016) additionally found that the factors that really generate electoral support for these political formations are xenophobia and an anti-elite discourse. Further, Iglesias, Paloma and Benítez (2021) have noted the importance of aspects such as territorial scale (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019), administrative levels and the distribution of the population in rural or urban areas (David et al., 2018; Rydgren and Ruth, 2013), to analyse the voter profile of this type of party.

On the other hand, focusing their discourse on cultural issues, Boscán, Llamazares and Wiesehomejer (2018), Bernhard and Kriesi (2019) and Castro and Mo Groba (2020) link religion with the possibility of voting for these formations[8].

Moreover, it is observed that radical populist right-wing parties contribute to voter mobilisation and generate greater interest in electoral campaigns (Żuk and Żuk, 2020). García Hípola and Pérez Castaños (2021) argue that Vox's strategy is to use negative

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[8] Authors also tend to refer to other lines of analysis to study electoral behaviour towards these parties, such as their position on issues related to immigration or gender equality (Immerzeel, Jaspers and Lubbers, 2013; Donà 2020). But these issues will not be measure in this chapter, as there are no variables in our dataset to asses them.

publicity or employ their resources to attack, to wear down opponents while still providing information.

Finally, some authors point out that radical right populist voters are more receptive to the mobilising impact of an identity framework. Fernández Riquelme (2020), for example, argues that Vox takes advantage of a perlocutionary effect to win citizens' votes, by activating what he describes as an 'exclusionary nationalist sentiment'.

Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) find that there has been a breeding ground for the emergence of a radical right-wing populist party in Spain. However, the existence of a major national axis (centre-periphery) makes it difficult to construct a clear national "we", and the PP's success in attracting voters on the right have previously made it hard for parties like Vox to gain a foothold. Along the same lines, Barrio (2020) and Climent and Montaner (2021) point out that the limited success of populist political options in Spain has been due to the prevalence of left-right and centre-periphery cleavages, which prevent the classic populist "people-elite" dichotomy from emerging.

However, thanks to the rise of Vox, a number of studies have been conducted in recent years (Barrio 2019; Michavila 2019), which have provided a more nuanced description of its voters. Thus, the most general profile, which coincides in several works, depicts a male voter, with a conservative ideology, living in urban areas and with an age at the Spanish average, or younger (Barrio, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana, 2020). Furthermore, this party's electorate has a marked Spanish nationalist character and when the territorial organisation of the state also comes into play, tends to position itself in favour of a politically centralised state (Barrio 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). In other factors such as education, we find disparities depending on the type of election analysed, given that Barrio (2019) finds people with higher levels of education in regional elections while Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana (2020) find people with lower education in national elections.

Finally, Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana (2020) and Ferreira (2019) find that these voters tend to be highly dissatisfied with the political situation, as they perceive politicians in negative terms. These authors also argue that this perception clearly stems from the Catalan conflict and that this triggers a response in the form of a strong Spanish identity, as a reaction to the 'threat' of independence; in other words, the primacy of the Catalan conflict in public debate has made the fight against regional independence the main hallmark of this political formation (Mendes and Dennison, 2020).

In addition to these socio-demographic variables, several authors have highlighted the clear anti-immigration and anti-feminist character of the formation (Michavila, 2019). Likewise, these values regarding gender, territorial organisation, nativism, and sovereignty have been portrayed as values that go directly against the fundamental values of the European Union (Gould, 2019).

When comparing the Vox voter and the voter of other radical right populist parties in Europe, Rama and Santana (2020) conclude that the Vox electorate is younger, male and more right-wing than average, that it is found among the moderately wealthy classes, students, those who consider the economic or political situation to be bad, and those who feel more Spanish and want greater territorial centralisation. In this sense, Gould (2019) also argues that both Vox in Spain and Alternative for Germany rely on a fictitious narrative of national identity when appealing for votes.

OBJECTIVES AND METHOD

Having set out the conditioning factors that identify the reasons for the success of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe in general, and Spain in particular, we now proceed to analyse Vox's voter profile in four different electoral arenas: European, national, regional and local. The aim is to check whether, following the example of the Spanish case and, specifically, the analysis of Vox, there are differences in the electorate depending on the electoral arena in which they compete.

In this sense, the profile is expected to vary depending on the electoral arena. Thus, we expect to find a similar trend to those put forward by other authors regarding both national and regional elections; but there might be changes in both local and European elections. This is largely explained by the theories of second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980), which already indicated that minority formations or those with less specific weight -even anti-system- may be favoured by electoral rules and/or the protest vote.

However, the fact that we are talking about elections of a different order is not the only justification for an analysis of the different electoral arenas and VOX's voters. As explained before, the studies carried out to date have found a multitude of differences among voters, both across countries and, in the specific case of VOX, across elections. Thus, depending on how the economic crisis has affected different countries, the success of radical populist right-wing parties has been one or the other (Rama and Cordero, 2018).

The same can be presumed to be true in the Spanish regions, where, depending on whether they have been hit by the recession, VOX's success will have varied.

The second element to consider is the differences depending on the structure and habitat of the countries (Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). In this sense, once again, in the Spanish regions there are differences not only based on their more rural or urban character, but also differences in terms of their capacity for political execution and action -competences resulting from decentralisation- which can lead to differences in the vote. The third of the elements to be taken into consideration and which justifies the possibility of finding differences between levels of government is that referring to national identity (Fernández Riquelme, 2020). In theory, the voters of these formations have a homogeneous idea of their country, and, in the case of Spain, this identity varies in strength and duality depending on the region analysed or the type of election at stake.

Finally, previous research has detected the existence of a change VOX's electorate profile between the different elections held since 2018 (Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana, 2019). Thus, thanks to the analysis of different electoral arenas, it will be possible to verify whether these differences have indeed occurred both over time and simultaneously. This is since, in electoral terms, VOX's strength because of the results it obtained in the 2019 elections has been very uneven not only between communities, but also in the different municipalities in which it presented candidacies, as well as in the European and national elections (Michavila, 2019).

To test our objective and hypothesis, we use individual survey data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas de España (hereafter, CIS[9]). To do so, we use eight different post-electoral surveys conducted by this institution in elections of any kind. Of these, two have been treated individually, based on three different analyses; namely, study number 3269 analysed the November 2019 general elections and study number 3253 carried out its analysis for the local and European elections, which took place simultaneously by the end of May 2019. Finally, in order to analyse the sub-national arena, six asynchronous studies have been added: number 3236, corresponding to the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia -which begin the electoral cycle ending in 2021 with

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[9] The CIS is a public institution that carries out social analyses through surveys on a variety of topics and, thanks to it being a public centre, makes all the data it collects openly available. More information at: http://www.cis.es

the elections in Catalonia and Madrid-; number 3253[10], of 13 autonomous communities held between April -Comunidad Valenciana- and May 2019; numbers 3293 and 3294, for the regional elections held in 2020 in the Basque Country and Galicia, respectively; 3306, for the 2021 regional elections in Catalonia; and finally, 3328, for the 2021 elections in the Community of Madrid.

To carry out the regional study we use the strategy of cross-sectional data aggregation or cross-sections, which is typically employed to increase the number of observations in the same universe and, usually, also to contrast longitudinal effects (Wooldridge, 2011). Thus, for the European and municipal level we counted 9,191 cases, for the national level 4,804 cases, and for the regional level 25,453 cases. Due to the low presence of declared Vox voters, all the databases have been weighted based on the aggregate electoral result obtained in the corresponding elections. In the case of regional elections that did not take place simultaneously, the average of all regions was used.

Despite the existence of different questions in each of the studies, we have been able to extract a series of indicators that are present across the board. Table 1 describes the variables that have been introduced in the different models and how they are categorised to understand the analysis that follows.

Table 1. Independent variables in the model

Variable Name	Variable Meaning	Coding for the analysis*
Sex	Sex	D: (1) man; (0) woman
Age	Age	S: (18) min.; (98) max.
Studies	Higher level of studies reached	S: (1) no studies; (4) university
Habitat size	Size of the town living in	S: (1) <2.000 inhabs.; (7) > 1.000.000 inhabs.
Employment	Employment situation	Fictional variables D: working (0), unemployed (1), retired (1) & others (1)
Social Class	Social class	Fictional variables D: Middle Class (0); Lower Class (1); Higher Class (1)
Political Sit.	Valuation of the political situation in the municipality/ region/ country/ European Union	S: (0) >dissatisfaction; (4) >satisfaction
Religious	Religiousness	D: (1) religious; (0) non-religious
Ideology	Ideological position	S: (0) ext. left; (10) ext. right
National Id.	National identity position	S: (1) Only Spanish; (5) Only Regional
Camp. Interest	Interest in following the electoral	S (1) None; (5) Many

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[10] They all share the same number as the survey regarding all three levels was conducted simultaneously, with different sections regarding each election.

|	campaign	
Decentralization[a]	Preferences for a more decentralized country	S: (1) >centralism; (5) >decentralism.

As can be seen, all the variables - with the sole exception of that referring to decentralisation, which was not asked about in the national study- are present in the four electoral arenas that will be measured here. To be able to compare the electorates, the dependent variable will always be the same, in dichotomous format, where the Vox voter has the value one (1) and the remaining voters, zero (0). With this type of variable, a logistic regression analysis (GLM) will be carried out, following the logit model, and combining both scale and dichotomous independent variables.

DATA ANALYSIS

Thanks to the theoretical analysis derived from previous studies and which has been previously described, it is clear what can be expected when it comes to identifying Vox's voter profile. Thus, we will proceed to test, with the variables included in Table 1, the four differentiated voter models for each of the electoral arenas.

After having carried out the relevant controls, Figure 1 shows the models of each of the analysed electoral arenas through their coefficients. Thanks to the graphical representation, it is possible to visually observe whether there are - or not - differences between elections, in terms of the profile of the Vox voter.

Graph 1. Model summary in different electoral arenas

Source: own elaboration with data from CIS.

Before breaking down each of the electoral arenas, it is worth highlighting the explanatory capacity of each model. Thus, the European model has a Nagelkerke R^2 of 0.67; the national model has an R^2 of 0.424; the regional one has an R of 0.635; and the local model has an R of 0.659. In this sense, all the analyses have outstanding explanatory power, so we can affirm their ability to generate differences in the voter's profiles by arenas, thanks to their comparison.

Once the explanatory capacity of each model has been established, we will begin to analyse the different graphs of coefficients in Figure 1, starting with the electoral arena at a higher level -the European level- and ending with that closest to the citizenry -the local level-. Thanks to the layout of the graphs, it is possible to visually check how the different independent variables are statistically significant or not, as well as whether the probability of voting for the party under analysis increases or decreases in each case, and in a comparative perspective.

Thus, in the case of the European electoral arena, we observe how being male and young increases the probability of voting for this type of party. In a positive way, we also see the effect of habitat size, showing that the larger the municipality, the greater the probability of voting for Vox. With respect to the dichotomous dummy variables that address employment status, we see how the probability of voting for Vox increases if a person is unemployed or retired, compared to those who are working. However, this tendency is reversed when we talk about other different employment situations compared to workers. In terms of social class, as the graph shows, the probability of support for this political formation decreases when a citizen is upper or lower class, as the middle-class are more likely to vote for the radical right-wing populist formation. Regarding the

political context, the likelihood of supporting this formation decreases if a potential voter thinks the prevailing situation is better. However, it increases for people who consider themselves religious, and for those more to the right on the ideological scale. The probabilities also increase for those who show a stronger Spanish national identity. In terms of interest in the electoral campaign, we find that people with a greater interest are more likely to vote for Vox; while finally, those in favour of greater decentralisation are less likely to vote for this formation.

Moving the focus to the national elections, we observe how the level of statistical significance of many variables disappears in this model. Gender and age continue to be significant, both in the same direction as in the previous analysis, with men and younger people more likely to vote for this party. In this case, the variable 'studies' is also added, which denotes a higher probability of voting for this party when one has a lower level of studies. In terms of employment status, people who are retired or in other situations are less likely to vote for this populist formation. Social class again works in the same way, but this time only in the relationship between middle class and lower class, with people being less likely to vote for Vox if they self-identify as belonging to the latter. The remaining variables, all significant, work exactly as in the previous model, drawing a profile of a right-wing, religious person who considers the political situation to be negative and who feels more Spanish than with a dual or regional subjective national identity. It is worth highlighting the fact that interest in the electoral campaign, which in this case changes sign compared to the European arena; with the greater the interest shown, the less likely it is to vote for Vox.

The third of the electoral spaces to be analysed is regional. In this case, we again find similar trends to the previous two. Thus, the sex and age variables are statistically significant, with the probability of voting for Vox increasing among men and decreasing as we move up the age scale. As in the case of the European elections, the size of the municipality is again relevant and has a positive influence, i.e., the larger the municipality, the greater the probability of voting for Vox. In terms of employment status, the unemployed seem to be more likely than the employed to vote for Vox - an element that was also present in the European arena. The upper social class again shows a lower probability of voting for Vox than the average -again as in the European case-. The remaining variables work in a similar way to those already analysed, showing a clear similarity with the European and national case, that is: assessment of a positive political

situation influences negatively; ideology positively as we move to the right; subjective national identity negatively as we move towards a dual or solely regional sentiment; interest in the campaign positively; and decentralisation negatively as more decentralising options are provided. In this case, unlike in the two previous analyses, religiosity is not shown to be statistically significant. This autonomous region model shows a substantial difference to the two previous -and also to the next to be discussed-: the explanatory capacity of the 'studies' variable. This variable acquires statistical significance in this model, indicating that the probability of voting for Vox increases as the level of education rises, changing effect from the national arena and showing our first main difference.

The last of the models under analysis is the municipal. This study found that gender, age and size of habitat act identically to the European and regional models; for their part, in the case of employment status, it is workers who seem to be more likely to vote for Vox than those who are in another situation not described in the model -unemployed and retired people do not report statistically significant results-. Focusing now on social class, we observe that the middle class is more likely to vote for Vox than the upper and lower classes, to the extent that the direction of the values is negative. The remaining variables, all of which are significant, work in the same way as in the previous cases; that is, the probabilities increase as one becomes more religious, more right-wing on the ideological scale and follows the electoral campaign with greater interest, and decrease as one's assessment of the political situation improves, as one moves towards a dual or solely regional identity and towards more decentralising positions in terms of the territorial organisation of the state.

In view of the different electoral scenarios in Spain in recent years, it is worth recapitulating the variables that profile the Vox voter in each electoral space. Table 2 shows the differences in each case, indicating each of the variables and the effect they have.

Table 2. Summarization of voter's profile by electoral scenario

Element	European	National	Regional	Local
Sex	Male	Male	Male	Male
Age	Younger	Younger	Younger	Younger
Studies		Lower	Higher	
Habitat	Bigger		Bigger	Bigger
Employment	Unemp. / Retired	Workers	Unempl.	Workers

	Workers > Others			
Social Class	Middle vs. L/H	Middle vs. L	Middle vs. H	Middle vs. L/H
Political Sit.	Negative	Negative	Negative	Negative
Religiousness	Religious	Religious		Religious
Ideology	Right	Right	Right	Right
National ID.	Spanish	Spanish	Spanish	Spanish
Camp. Interest	Interested	Not Interested	Interested	Interested
Decentr.	Centraliz.		Centraliz.	Centraliz.

Source: own elaboration.

As can be seen, in the four electoral contexts, the probability of voting for Vox is higher among men and decreases with increasing age. As the variables shown in Table 1 are distributed, this gives us a profile of a young male -in line with the findings of Barrio (2019) and Turnbull, Rama and Santana (2020). We also find other elements common to the four arenas, such as ideology (Alonso and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015); assessment of the political situation (Ferreira, 2019); subjective national identity, and; attitudes towards decentralisation (Barrio 2019, Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019). One of these variables has a positive influence and three others have a negative influence. The one with a positive influence is ideology, indicating that, in all cases, as one moves to the right on the ideological axis, the probability of voting for Vox increases. The three negative variables -indicating that when moving along the corresponding scales, the probability of voting for Vox decreases- correspond to: subjective national identity -the probabilities are lower as we move towards dual positions (combining in different ways Spanish sentiment with regional sentiment) and only of their region; the political situation -the better the assessment, the lower the probabilities; and, finally, decentralisation -as we consider that Spain should be more decentralised, the probabilities decrease.

The influence of level of education does not have statistical significance in two of the four electoral arenas; however, in the case of the national elections it shows a negative influence, with the probability of voting for Vox being lower among the most educated (Barrio, 2019), while in the regional elections, the analysis shows the opposite result, with the most educated opting for this party (Rama and Cordero, 2018). Regarding the size of the habitat, in all cases except at national level, we find that the influence is positive, meaning that residents in larger municipalities are more likely to opt for this party. This might be explained by the fact that Vox does not yet have a strong structure at local level,

given that its emergence has been top-down, starting at national level and moving down to the regions and municipalities.

Religiosity, on the other hand, shows positive values in all cases except at regional level, where it is not statistically significant. This, according to the coding of the variable, denotes a greater probability of being a voter for this formation in the case of self-identifying as Catholic, in line with the postulates of Castro and Mo Groba (2020).

In terms of the social class of its voters, the middle class is the most likely to vote for Vox in all arenas. In some cases, such as in the European or local context, the likelihood is higher for the middle class than the other two classes; at national level, only the lower class, and in the regional, only the upper class. This is a counter-theoretical effect to what Rama and Santana (2020) determined, who found a higher probability of voting for Vox among the upper classes. Employment status also fluctuates unevenly, with differences between the European and regional cases on the one hand, and the national and local cases on the other. The former is more likely to vote for Vox among the unemployed, while the latter among workers.

The only case in which we find divergences between what happens in the different arenas is in the interest in following the electoral campaign (Żuk and Żuk, 2020). In this sense, following the election campaign with greater interest leads to an increased likelihood of voting for the party under study. This is true in the European, regional, and local arenas; but the opposite at national level. This might be because, as explained in the context of this chapter, 2019 was an intense electoral period, with two general elections coinciding in a span of seven months, as well as regional, local and European elections.

Taken together, the figure that the analysis of the Vox voter reveals is that of a young, middle-class man. He is more likely to live in medium-sized or large municipalities. Moreover, he feels Spanish and ideologically right-wing and is also in favour of a more centralised country. Finally, being a person of religious faith is also part of the profile of this electorate.

CONCLUSIONS

The main aim of this chapter was to test whether the different electoral arenas modified the profile of the radical populist right-wing electorate in the case of Spain and, in particular, through Vox voters. In this sense, although the working hypothesis was about the possibility of finding differences linked to second-order choice theories, the results of

the GLM models have shown us that there are no such differences -in line with the premonitory nature of the electoral context-, and only the study levels show variation in two out of the four arenas.

With minor exceptions, the profile of the Vox voter in the different electoral arenas analysed is similar. In general terms, the probability of voting for Vox increases among males, young people, those residing in larger municipalities, religious people, those with a low opinion of the political situation, who are interested in the electoral campaign, who consider themselves right-wing, with a predominantly Spanish national identity and with a preference for a centralised territorial organisation of the state. This absence of differences -except for the variable referring to level of education- may in many cases be due to the quasi-simultaneous nature of the elections, with several of them taking place at the same time, which may have led to a tendency towards a 'nationalisation of the vote' that will have to be verified with the analysis of subsequent processes.

However, as we have observed when analysing the electoral context, the percentages of representation obtained by Vox in the last four years have differed according to the arenas in which the elections have been held. The explanation for this may be due to the party's lack of structure and penetration in the first analysed elections, rather than the existence of a different voter profile from one election to the next. For example, in the municipal elections of May 2019, in which Vox obtained a very poor percentage of votes due to aspects that may have more to do with the structure of the party itself (very basic and with few candidates) or with the loyalty of the vote in rural areas of the country, than with the fact that there are substantial differences between the profile of this voter and that of other types of elections.

A few years ago, everything indicated that Vox was destined to be a protest party; but the data shows that it seems to be here to stay. The regional elections in Castilla y León in February 2022 - outside the cycle under study here- mark a turning point in the analysis of the party and its voters, as the party is not only seen as an acceptable governmental partner, but part of the government itself, in a similar way to the Austrian FPÖ, the last party of this type to govern a European region.

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