

Ideology: The Reasons Behind Placement on the Left-Right Scale

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12.1 THE MEANING OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology is one of the most studied questions in social sciences. In previous decades it has been argued that political parties' ideologies have blurred and reflected fewer differences in their political foundations (Bell 2000; Lipset 2001; Dalton 2006). However, the concepts of left and right remain as vivid in political conflict as they were in the past and have not ceased to remain as a point of reference for political actors, as shown by the fact that it is still the most important single factor explaining citizens' vote (Thomassen 2005; Montero and Lago 2010).

In this chapter, the ideological distribution of members of parliament (MPs) is analyzed and compared with that of citizens, and the reasons of ideological self-placement on the left-right scale are explored. In previous Spanish research there are a number of studies that address the meaning of ideology, although most of them focus on citizens and not the elites. The factors that explain the location of Spanish citizens as left or right has been analyzed in depth (Maravall 1980; Sani and Montero 1986; Díez Medrano et al. 1989; Montero and Torcal 1990; Montero 1994b; Torcal and Medina 2002; Medina 2004, 2010; Torcal 2011) as well as the relationship

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between attitudes and preferences on public policy.¹ However, there are no empirical studies explaining the foundations of left-right placement of the Spanish MPs. This research presents the novelty of analyzing the ideology of Spanish political elites with data comparable to those obtained from the whole population.

Since Inglehart and Klingemann's study (1976, pp. 244–245) it has been established that self-placement of individuals on the left-right scale respond to three major factors: (1) the purely ideological or value-based factor, which considers that the scale reflects the principles and attitudes of the person concerning the main issues of society, (2) social-structural factor, which refers to the identities of the individuals based on their social class and religious beliefs, and (3) partisan factor, which points out that positioning on the scale is also the result of identification with a particular political party, and that such election would not respond as much to the values and principles of the person but to the perceptions they have of their preferred party (Huber 1989; Knutsen 2004; Freire 2008; Freire and Belchior 2011; Weber 2012).

The first component of the scale, related to values and political preferences, is the most intuitively obvious. Since the inception of the terms left and right in the eighteenth century, these have been associated with substantive ideological meanings (Bobbio 1995; Herreros 2011). There are multiple definitions of ideology, but they coincide in considering it as a more or less structured set of beliefs and values about society, politics and economics.² Ideology would thus constitute a construct that encompasses the individual's main values regarding social order and facilitates decision-making by simplifying the complexity of politics to fewer and simpler options.

As an expression of ideology, the left-right continuum is still problematic, since it consists of a one-dimensional scale while political and moral conflicts comprise multiple components. Nonetheless, it is assumed that self-placement on the scale may reflect, albeit roughly, a compendium of the individual's position on a number of major issues. Namely, the most important issues associated to left and right have been those related to the organization of the economy and the redistribution of goods, as well as the relevance attributed to the value of equality: theoretically, economic equality would be a priority for the left, while inequality would be more acceptable for the right (Downs 1957; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Lafferty and Knutsen 1984; Bobbio 1995; Gunther and Kuan 2007; Herreros 2011; Weber 2012).

The second component of the left-right divide, the social-structural factor, assumes that the position of the individuals in the social structure leads them to create identities associated with ideological concepts (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, pp. 245; Bartolini 2000, pp. 15–25; Freire 2006, pp. 361–362). There are two social factors that contribute the most to creating a left-right identity. On one side there is social class, the element that has been traditionally associated with the socio-economic cleavage (Freire 2008). On the other side there are the religious beliefs of individuals, which in many countries acquire considerable political salience and constitute one of the most important social cleavages (Sani and Sartori 1983; Huber 1989; Knutsen 2004; Freire 2006; Hellwig 2008). Although the secularization of modern societies has led us to consider that the religious cleavage has lost the relevance of other periods, it is also true that religious beliefs remain a crucial element to political identity and voting choice, especially when it is activated by the political elites (Cebolla et al. 2013: p. 2).

Other issues that have been associated with the left-right scale are the priority given to security over liberty (Herreros 2011), the contrast between tradition and modernity (Herreros 2011; Weber 2012) or the priorities regarding the satisfaction of material goods and values of self-expression, that is, aspects associated with the materialist/post-materialist cleavage (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Inglehart 1977) which would include issues such as the environment, (Mair 2002) gender (Evans 1993) or homosexuality (Medina 2010). What is indisputable is that the issues associated in this scale can vary from one society to another over time, so that left and right have distinctive meanings in each country and at each moment (Jahn 2011).

The partisan component of the scale suggests that the values of the individuals are not so relevant and that party identification may have a great impact on left-right self-placement. People get to create psychological and affective bonds with the parties, which leads them to adjust their position to the value they consider appropriate for their party, regardless of their actual opinions and attitudes on particular issues (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Klingemann 1979). In this way, left-right position would function more as a party identity tag than as a compendium of values and attitudes (Huber 1989; Freire 2008; Weber 2012).

Although numerous studies support the importance of the partisan component for all citizens, they do not seem to uphold this to the same degree for elites. In the seminal study of Converse (1964) it was established

that the political elites and the more educated citizens manifested attitudes that were more consistent and ideologically structured than public opinion in general. Political elites, thanks to their greater political knowledge, are more capable to interpret their position in ideological terms than the average voter and also present a greater coherence and structuring of their attitudes (Kritzer 1978; Arian and Shamir 1983; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Dalton 2013). Naturally, politicians also have partisan allegiances that influence their values and attitudes, but as they are more sophisticated political actors it is assumed that they are able to place themselves on the ideological scale in a way that reflects their personal opinions, not those of their party.

What seems obvious from the literature is that the three factors mentioned—social/structural, values and partisan—have different weights when configuring the position of elites and voters. In the case of the elites, it is likely that the values factor has a considerably greater impact than for voters. In the case of citizens, on the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the weight of the partisan factor is greater due to their lower levels of commitment and political knowledge (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1997; Freire and Belchior 2011, 2013).

As far as the social/structural factor is concerned, previous evidence is not as unanimous. On the one hand, certain studies propose that the social/structural factor has greater significance for the citizens than for the political elites, for the same reasons the partisan factor does (Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 12). On the other hand, it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that in certain societies and junctures, parties are especially divided around a cleavage and attempt to trigger it and make it more present in the political debate. In the case of Spain, several studies demonstrate the importance of religion as a basic element in shaping the left and right identity, as well as voting choice (Montero 1994a; Montero et al. 2008; Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014). Many of the debates associated with the ideological conflict of left and right are related to religion and the role the Catholic Church plays (such as religious teaching or Church funding) or to moral issues that have a religious implication (such as abortion and same-sex marriage). Moreover, it is a conflict that has been reinforced in recent years by political parties themselves (Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014), which raises the question of whether the political elite is more divided than citizens around this issue and more influenced by it when it comes to the left-right scale.

Therefore, the hypotheses that will be contrasted in the chapter are the following:

- Hypothesis 1: The weight of the social/structural factor in MPs is lesser than in citizens due to the former superior political knowledge.
- Hypothesis 2: The weight of the social/structural factor in MPs is greater in comparison to citizens due to their greater religious dissent.
- Hypothesis 3: The weight of the values factor is greater in MPs than in citizens.
- Hypothesis 4: The weight of the partisan factor is more significant in citizens than in MPs.

The remainder of this chapter is structured in three sections. The first is a brief description of the left-right averages and distributions of MPs and citizens. In the second the main empirical argument is developed, comparing the significance of the different explanatory factors of ideology in MPs and citizens in a series of OLS regression models, which will contrast the hypothesis mentioned above. Finally, the conclusions summarize the main findings of the research.

12.2 LEFT AND RIGHT IN MPs AND CITIZENS

Spanish citizens have tended to rank on average in a left of center ideological position, between 4.5 and 4.9 (on a scale of 1–10) since 1996, according to CIS barometers. In periods of electoral dominance of PP (People's Party), the average tends to be in the upper area of that rank, while in periods of dominance of PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) the average is closer to 4.5. The slight leaning on the left is the consequence of a large group of citizens in left of center positions (3–4) and another large group in proper center positions (5–6), while the other groups, left (1–2), right of center (7–8) and right (9–10) are much smaller than the previous two.³

Table 12.1 shows the average left-right positions of citizens and MPs, separated in a number of broad categories. The voters' mean is 4.8 and there are no significant differences between men and women, although there are considerable disparities between autonomous regions. The MPs that are most left-wing are in Catalonia and Andalusia (4.0 and 4.1 respectively), while those from the remainder of Spain (all regions except

Table 12.1 Average left-right self-placement of voters and MPs (1–10) by gender and party

		<i>Andalucia</i>	<i>Catalonia</i>	<i>Galicia</i>	<i>Basque C.</i>	<i>Other reg.</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>(N)</i>
Male	Voters	4.6	4.3	4.8	3.9	5.0	4.8	(1017)
	MPs	4.1	3.9	4.7	4.1	4.7	4.5	(344)
Female	Voters	4.8	4.2	4.6	3.9	5.1	4.8	(990)
	MPs	4.1	4.0	4.6	4.5	4.6	4.5	(225)
PP	Voters	6.3	6.5	6.8	6.5	6.6	6.6	(577)
	MPs	5.6	5.7	5.8	6.1	5.9	5.9	(243)
PSOE	Voters	3.7	3.4	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.7	(473)
	MPs	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.3	(235)
IU	Voters	3.3	2.7	3.0	3.6	3.0	3.0	(152)
	MPs	2.0	2.6		3.0	3.0	2.7	(17)
CiU	Voters		5.2				5.2	(53)
	MPs		4.9				4.9	(16)
PNV	Voters				4.8		4.8	(10)
	MPs				4.5		4.5	(15)
Otros	Voters	4.7	3.4	3.0	2.5	4.4	4.0	(192)
	MPs		3.1	3.1	3.0	3.9	3.5	(43)
Total	Voters	4.7	4.3	4.7	3.9	5.1	4.8	(1670)
	MPs	4.1	4.0	4.7	4.3	4.7	4.5	(569)

Source: Elaborated by the author from CIS 2827 and CIS 2930. Voters' party refers to the 2011 general election, which means that voters of a certain party may have chosen a different party in another election

Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country) are leaning more to the right (4.7). As expected, the most right-wing party is PP (5.9 on average), followed by CiU (Convergence and Union) (4.9), PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) (4.5), PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) (3.3), and IU (United Left) (2.7).

A noteworthy fact is that political representatives are more left-oriented than their constituents. This is true for the whole sample set and also for each of the autonomous regions, with the exception of the Basque Country. In the case of IU and the main nationalist parties (CiU and PNV) the difference is around 0.3 points. In the case of PSOE, the difference is 0.4 points, with a similar pattern in all the regions. More striking however, is the difference for PP, which in this case amounts to 0.7 points (5.9 for MPs and 6.6 for citizens), also running in a similar pattern in all the autonomous regions. This is a result consistent with previous research on political elites, which has also seen a slightly more right-oriented citizenship than its representatives (Dalton 1985, pp. 275–277; Hoffman-Lange 2008, p. 61).

Table 12.2 presents the ideological distribution of politicians and citizens and helps understand the discrepancies between them. It shows that the ideological distribution of voters is more dispersed than that of MPs, which is also consistent with previous research (Hoffman-Lange 2008, p. 60). For example, while 13% of PSOE voters are placed in far-left positions (1–2), only 7% of their representatives identified that way. Likewise, while 10% of PP voters are placed in far-right positions (9–10), no MP displays such right-wing values. In this way, it can be said that the party representatives better reflect the ideology of their average voters than those of voters positioned at the extremes of the distribution of each party.

In any case, the most conservative voters of all parties are ideologically less represented by their MPs, which is notably considerable for PP. Table 12.2 demonstrates that about 50% of PP voters are placed in right-wing values (7–10), but only 22% of their representatives are positioned like so (and among them almost all were positioned in 7). By contrast, while 77% of PP MPs declare themselves centrists (5–6) only 44% of their voters were placed in centrist values. The PSOE also underrepresents its right-wing electorate, as it highlights the disproportion between its percentage of centrist voters (twenty three percent) and that of MPs in centrist ideological positions (6%).

Table 12.2 Left-right self-placement distribution of voters and MPs (in %)

		1–2	3–4	5–6	7–8	9–10
		<i>Left</i>				<i>Right</i>
PP	MPs	0	0	77	22	0
	Voters	1	5	47	38	10
PSOE	MPs	7	87	6	0	0
	Voters	13	62	23	1	0
IU	MPs	35	65	0	0	0
	Voters	37	50	13	0	0
CiU	MPs	0	38	56	6	0
	Voters	0	30	51	17	2
PNV	MPs	0	47	53	0	0
	Voters	0	30	60	10	0
Otros	MPs	14	70	14	2	0
	Voters	19	40	36	3	2
Total (N)	MPs	5 (30)	46 (260)	40 (224)	10 (56)	0 (0)
	Votantes	10 (159)	33 (492)	40 (501)	14 (275)	4 (73)

Source: Elaborated by the author from CIS 2827 and CIS 2930

12.3 THE EXPLANATION OF IDEOLOGY

This section of the chapter will establish a series of explanatory models of the positions on the left-right scale of MPs and citizens, while considering the three factors: social/structural, values and partisan. The first factor includes variables related to social class and religiousness of people which, as we have seen in the introduction, give rise to the creation of social identities relevant to ideological positioning. Social class can be measured by the respondent's occupation and education level, as has been done in numerous previous studies, including some already mentioned (Freire 2008, p. 192; Weber 2012, pp. 107–109). However, given that the occupation of the vast majority of MPs falls within the categories of executives, professionals, and technicians and that they also have higher education qualifications (see chapter 1), it may appear to be more convenient to utilize the occupation and educational level of the parents as indicators of their position in the social structure at the moment in which political consciousness and the ideology of the MP was formed.

Religiousness can be measured through a scale of beliefs and practices, at the extremes of which are Catholics and believers of other practicing religions and, on the other end, are atheists and non-believers. The importance of religion as a basic element of left and right identity has already been established in the introductory section and this research confirms the evidence. Although the table is not presented for the sake of space, data show that practicing Catholic MPs are on average at 5.8, while atheists/indifferent are on average at 3.4, with non-practicing Catholics remaining at an intermediate position of 4.8. One fact worth noting is that left-wing politicians are significantly less religious than their voters (see chapter 1) while in the case of PP is the other way around: religious beliefs and practices are considerable more intense among their MPs than their constituents. This indicates that religious practice could be a more important element in explaining the left-right divide among politicians than among citizens. Given the intrinsic relevance of religiousness, in the statistical models that are proposed at the end of the section the social/structure factor splits into two components: social origin and class on one hand, and religiousness on the other.

The second group of variables are those related to values. Values are beliefs that prescribe behavioral norms and determine people's attitudes towards specific issues (Roekach 1973), such as the belief in economic equality or in environmental protection. In this chapter, two variables are

included in the value factor: the preference for economic equality and the position in a scale that trades liberty and security.⁴ As the first variable is concerned, we have already seen in the introduction that academic literature supposes that one of the most important characteristics that defines the leftist identity is the aim of reducing inequalities through government's actions, while rejection of this belief is associated with right-wing positions (Freire 2008; Medina 2010; Weber 2012; Freire and Belchior 2013).

The belief in egalitarianism is measured by the degree of agreement with the following statement: "The government should take actions to reduce income differences." This is an interesting variable because it directly tries to grasp the support of state's intervention to reduce economic inequality and does not simply refer to a general support for social policy. Data from the MPs' survey shows that those who most agree with the statement above are considerably more to the left than those who most disagree (the table with the data is not included for the sake of space). It also holds true within each party. For example, the PP's MPs who disagree with government intervention to reduce income differences are 0.4 points to the right of those who agree with that intervention. In the case of PSOE, the difference is 0.7 points. Although MPs of all parties tend to support some government intervention to reduce income levels, there is evidence that it may be a factor that explains left-right position.

The other variable included in the values factor is the respondent's position on a scale of 0–10 where the lowest score represents the highest preference for liberty and 10 the highest preference for security. Although the value of freedom can be associated with both the left and right (Herrerros 2011, pp. 25–33), the contrast between liberty and security (or between libertarian and authoritarian values) has often been considered an essential component of the ideological conflict (Knutsen and Kumlin 2005; Freire and Belchior 2013). Figure 12.1 shows the average location on the liberty/security scale of MPs based on their left-right position, which reveals a clear relationship between the two (Pearson's correlation coefficient is 0.36**). The most right-wing MPs rank over three points more in favor of security than the most left-wing, which is an obvious indication that it might be an explanatory variable in the model.

The last factor considered is party identification. One may assume that in the case of MPs, ideological identity should precede integration into a party. However, it may be that some members of the political elite are not so ideologically coherent and, as explained in the theoretical section, their




Fig. 12.1 Preferences of MPs between liberty and security by ideology (Source: CIS 2827)

positions on the scale respond largely to attempts to accommodate the ideological perceptions of their parties. The introduction of the partisan variable in the model may serve to better fit the explanation and examine the strength of the other factors. If it happens that after introducing the party variable the significance of the model increases and the coefficients of the other variables are greatly reduced, it would be an indicator that left-right position also responds to party labels in the case of MPs.

All the factors considered have been incorporated into two OLS regression models, one for MPs and one for citizens. The dependent variable in both models is the position on the left-right scale and the independent variables have been introduced in four blocks that correspond with the three factors mentioned above, plus religious identity, which has been taken from the social/structural factor. Thus, the first block is the social/structural factor I (social origin and class) and includes, in the case of MPs, the educational level of both mother and father,⁵ the occupation of the father,⁶ as well as gender. In the citizens' model the variables are educational attainment, occupation,⁷ gender and age. The second block is the social/structural factor II (religious identity), which for both MPs and citizens incorporates the respondents' religious beliefs and practices.⁸ The third block is the ideological/values factor and it includes two variables: the degree of agreement with government intervention to reduce income inequalities⁹ and the position on the scale that trades liberty and security.¹⁰

The fourth block is the partisan factor, which includes party membership in the case of MPs and voting for a certain political party in the case of citizens. Only the five main political parties have been included: PP, PSOE, IU, CiU and PNV.¹¹

Table 12.3 presents the results of the four OLS models for MPs and Table 12.4 the data for citizens. In both tables the goodness of fit of the first model is very low, with an adjusted R^2 of 0.04 for MPs and 0.02 for citizens. Politicians who come from families of entrepreneurs or executives or whose parents are more educated tend to place themselves more to the right, as do the citizens with professional or business backgrounds. However, the explanatory capacity of the first model is weak, which suggests that social origin and class are not very important in the making of ideological identities of both MPs and citizens.

By contrast, the significance of the second model improves considerably for MPs (adjusted R^2 is now 0.42), which means that the religious practice of the politician explains an acceptable percentage of the variance. Practicing Catholics score one point more to the right of the scale than non-practicing Catholics (other social/structural factors remaining constant), while atheists and non-religious score 1.3 points more to the left. In the case of citizens the non-standardized coefficients are similar, but the fit of the model is much worse. The religious factor improves of the R^2 in 0.13, in contrast to the 0.38 improvement in the model for politicians. The data indicate that religious practice is a much more significant factor in the ideological position of MPs than that of citizens.

With the data presented so far, it seems that Hypothesis 1 should be rejected. The weight of the social/structural factor (including the religious factor) is stronger among MPs than in citizens—a result not too different from that obtained by Freire and Belchior (2013) in their study of citizens and political elites in Portugal, but conflicting with the literature which states that political commitment and knowledge reduce the weight of the social component (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1997).

On the other hand, the evidence seems to confirm Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the impact of the social/structural factor is higher among MPs than citizens because they are more divided by the religious cleavage, which is also confirmed in the aforementioned Portuguese study (Freire and Belchior 2013, p. 13). Research on the religious vote in Spain has emphasized the role that the political elite played in instigating religious conflict during certain periods, despite the process of

Table 12.3 OLS models explaining left-right self-placement of MPs

	1	2	3	4
Father's education	0.17** (0.18)	0.13** (0.14)	0.15*** (0.16)	0.07* (0.08)
Mother's education	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.00
Father manager or proprietor	0.40** (0.11)	0.30* (0.08)	0.22	0.11
Father professional	0.37	0.04	-0.05	-0.06
Father skilled manual worker	0.23	0.19	0.20	0.25** (0.08)
Father non-skilled worker	-0.52	-0.49	-0.46	0.15
Gender	-0.03	-0.11	-0.11	-0.01
Practicing member of Church		1.00*** (0.30)	0.86*** (0.26)	0.34*** (0.10)
Non-religious		-1.30*** (-0.43)	-1.04*** (-0.20)	-0.01
Economic equality			-0.26*** (-0.20)	-0.14*** (-0.11)
Liberty vs. security			0.16*** (0.18)	0.08*** (0.09)
PP				1.97*** (0.66)
PSOE				-0.15
IU				-0.85*** (-0.09)
CiU and PNV				0.97*** (0.15)
(Intercept)	3.71***	4.34***	4.49***	3.36***
R ²	0.06	0.43	0.51	0.72
R ² adjusted	0.04	0.42	0.49	0.71
R ² improvement	0.06	0.38	0.07	0.21

Source: CIS 2827

Note: The dependent variable is left-right self-placement on a scale in which 1 is far-left and 10 is far-right. As for codification of independent variables, see notes 5–11. Each model incorporates a group of variables as blocks: (1) Social-structural factor I (social background and class), (2) Social-structural factor II (religious practice), (3) Values factor, (4) Party. Non-standardized coefficients are shown. Standardized coefficients, if significant, are shown between brackets. The levels of statistical significance are: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$

intense secularization of Spanish society (Montero et al. 2008; Cebolla et al. 2013; Cordero 2014). In a recent study (Cordero 2014) it is argued that both the left and the right parties have striven to mobilize public opinion and include proposals concerning religious and moral

Table 12.4 OLS models explaining left-right self-placement of citizens

	1	2	3	4
Educational attainment	-0.08	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03
Managers and proprietors	0.86*** (0.11)	0.59*** (0.08)	0.49** (0.06)	0.20
Professionals	0.09	0.18	0.16	0.17
Skilled manual workers	0.16	0.10	0.06	0.07
Non-skilled workers	-0.19	-0.27	-0.21	-0.06
Gender	0.11	-0.13	-0.16	-0.10
Age	0.01** (0.08)	0.00	-0.01** (-0.06)	0.00
Practicing member of Church		0.80*** (0.15)	0.71*** (0.13)	0.37*** (0.07)
Non-religious		-1.43*** (-0.32)	-1.14*** (-0.25)	-0.45*** (-0.10)
Economic equality			0.23*** (0.10)	0.05
Liberty vs. security			0.20*** (0.23)	0.10*** (0.12)
Vote PP				2.08*** (0.49)
Vote PSOE				-0.54*** (-0.12)
Vote IU				-0.92*** (-0.14)
Vote CiU or PNV				0.82*** (0.08)
(Intercept)	4.51***	5.62***	4.08***	4.11***
R ²	0.03	0.15	0.21	0.51
R ² adjusted	0.02	0.15	0.21	0.51
R ² improvement	0.03	0.13	0.06	0.30

Source: CIS 2930

Note: The dependent variable is left-right self-placement on a scale in which 1 is far-left and 10 is far-right. As for codification of independent variables, see notes 7–11. Each model incorporates a group of variables as blocks: (1) Social-structural factor I (social background and class), (2) Social-structural factor II (religious practice), (3) Values factor, (4) Party. Non-standardized coefficients are shown. Standardized coefficients, if significant, are shown between brackets. The levels of statistical significance are: * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$

issues in their platforms, especially since 2004, thus reviving the religious vote. The impetus attributed to religious conflict by major parties seems consistent with the notable presence of the religious factor in the ideological identity of the political elites.

The third model incorporates the values factor and elevates the explained variance to 0.49 among MPs and 0.21 (adjusted R^2) among citizens, with similar increases in both cases (0.07 and 0.06 respectively). The two variables in the values factor are significant in both regressions and follow the expected directions: the preference for government intervention to reduce economic inequality is associated with the left and the preference for security before liberty is associated with the right. This model predicts, for example, that an MP who fully supports active intervention of the government to reduce economic inequality would be located one more point toward the left than an MP who fully rejects such intervention. Yet, the values factor shows a similar impact on both citizens and MPs and therefore Hypothesis 3 cannot be confirmed. This result challenges the idea that MPs are always more ideologically coherent than citizens in value terms due to their broader knowledge and higher political sophistication, as it is argued by some scholars (Dalton 2013), or as evidenced in Portugal by Freire and Belchior (2013) who see a clear divergence between elites and voters.

The fourth and last model includes political parties in dichotomous variables and improves the explained variance in the MPs regression by 0.21 to an adjusted R^2 of 0.71. The gain in explained variance is noteworthy but still smaller than that obtained by the social/structural factor II (religious practice). Obviously, the introduction of the party factor moderates the explanatory power of the other variables, but nevertheless the condition of practicing believer and the two variables related to values retain a strong significance. On the contrary, in the citizens' regression it is the party factor that produces the higher gain of explained variance (0.3) and rises the adjusted R^2 up to 0.51. This indicates that the left-right positions of MPs could be solidly explained with variables prior to their party affiliation, whereas for voters the partisan factor is key to understanding their location in the ideological scale. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is confirmed, which sustains that the partisan factor is larger among voters than MPs, in accordance with previous literature. (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1997; Freire and Belchior 2013).

12.4 CONCLUSIONS

This research shows that Spanish MPs are ideologically placed to the left of citizens and, within each party, representatives are also located to the left of their voters. It is remarkable that barely any of PP's MPs represent

the most conservative voters of this organization. Similarly, very few of PSOE's MPs place themselves as their centrist voters.

Regression analysis of MPs' self-placement in the left-right scale shows that the social/structural factor explains by itself a large amount of the variance, due to the weight of religious identity. Although the belief in egalitarian values and the preferences in the liberty-security scale are also statistically significant in the models, they are less so than religious beliefs and practices. This confirms the importance that previous literature has attributed to religion in shaping political ideology and voting choice in Spain, but it goes further by proving that religion is more associated to ideology for MPs than for citizens. This finding differs from some already mentioned studies that argue that political elites place themselves in the left-right scale more in terms of values than according to social/structural factors.

Finally, there is evidence that the most powerful factor in the left-right placement of citizens is the partisan factor, clearly above the significance of this factor for MPs. In agreement with previous research, data shows that citizens adjust their ideological position far less than MPs in substantive and non-partisan terms. In this regard, this chapter proves that for the Spanish political elites the concepts of left and right are more than mere partisan labels, although they are better explained in terms of social identity than in terms of values or social beliefs.

NOTES

1. Also the impact of ideology on the vote, although the issue is not addressed here.
2. Ideology may be defined as a "belief system centered on a small number of basic principles" (Kritzer 1978, p. 485). A review of the definitions of ideology can be found in Gerring (1997).
3. In all barometers of CIS there is a relatively high percentage of citizens (between 15% and 20%) who do not place themselves on the ideological scale. By contrast, the percentage of MPs who do not position on the scale is only 2%.
4. As explained in the introduction, there are other issues that could have been included in this block, such as the materialism/post-materialism divide, but such issues were not easy to analyze with the available data and therefore a simpler model was chosen.
5. The educational levels of fathers and mothers are ordered into seven categories: "Not schooled", "Incomplete primary school", "Completed

- primary school”, “Lower secondary school”, “Upper secondary school”, “College” (up to three years of university education), and “Graduate and post-graduate.”
6. As for the father’s occupation four *dummy* variables are included: “Managers and proprietors”, “Professionals”, “Skilled manual workers” and “Non-skilled workers”; “Non-manual workers” being the reference category. The mother’s occupation has not been incorporated in the final model, since two thirds of MPs’ mothers were engaged in domestic work and the variable has not proved statistically significant.
 7. The respondent’s educational attainment is measured in the same seven categories as the father’s educational level (see note 5). Four *dummy* variables are included ordered for the respondent’s occupation: “Managers and proprietors”, “Professionals”, “Skilled manual workers” and “Non-skilled workers”; while “Non-manual workers” is the reference category.
 8. Religious beliefs and practices are measured by two *dummy* variables: “Practising member of a Church” and “Non-religious”; while “Non-practising member of a Church” is the reference category.
 9. The agreement with the statement, “The government should take actions to reduce income inequality,” is measured on a scale of five categories: “Strongly agree”, “Somewhat agree”, “Neither agree or disagree”, “Somewhat disagree” and “Strongly disagree.”
 10. Self-placement on a scale of 0–10, where 0 means preference for maximum liberty even at the expense of losing security and 10 means maximum security even at the expense of losing liberty.
 11. Four *dummy* variables are included, one for each of the three major political parties (PP, PSOE and IU), the other for the two main nationalist parties combined (CiU and PNV), leaving all the other parties as the reference category.

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