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oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/39112024-05-13T09:58:15Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Poza, David J. Santos Martín, José Ignacio Galán Ordax, José Manuel López Paredes, Adolfo 2016-01-26T12:00:43Z 2016-01-26T12:00:43Z 2011-03 1932-6203 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3911 10.1371/journal.pone.0017661 The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent’s most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders. eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution 4.0 International Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices info:eu-repo/semantics/article