2026-06-17T18:22:29Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52032024-05-13T10:37:25Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Sandholm, William H. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 2020-01-09T12:20:59Z 2020-01-09T12:20:59Z 2020-01 0022-0531 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957 We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature. eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Evolutionary game dynamics Best experienced payoff dynamics Sampling dynamics Dynamic stability Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics info:eu-repo/semantics/article