2026-05-05T12:33:06Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52362024-05-10T11:24:12Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
Sandholm, William H.
Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
Evolutionary game theory
backward induction
centipede game
computational algebra
We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each
of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being
against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was
highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative
play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable
state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of
agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game.
Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.
2020-03-09
2020-03-09
2019-11
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
1933-6837
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236
10.3982/TE3565
eng
Theoretical Economics. 2019, V. 14, n. 4, p. 1347–1386
https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/view/45
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/ECO2017-83147-
C2-2-P
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX15/00362
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX16/00048
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
Econometric Society