2026-07-20T01:16:33Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52362024-05-10T11:24:12Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Sandholm, William H. author Izquierdo, Segismundo S. author Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo author 2019-11 We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play. 1933-6837 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236 10.3982/TE3565 Evolutionary game theory backward induction centipede game computational algebra Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game