2026-05-05T12:32:54Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52362024-05-10T11:24:12Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game Sandholm, William H. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo Evolutionary game theory backward induction centipede game computational algebra We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play. 2020-03-09T09:07:06Z 2020-03-09T09:07:06Z 2020-03-09T09:07:06Z 2019-11 info:eu-repo/semantics/article 1933-6837 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236 10.3982/TE3565 eng Theoretical Economics. 2019, V. 14, n. 4, p. 1347–1386 https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/view/45 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/ECO2017-83147- C2-2-P info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX15/00362 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX16/00048 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional Econometric Society