2026-06-28T08:35:49Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/70082024-05-10T11:55:29Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 2022-09-22T07:30:11Z 2022-09-22T07:30:11Z 2022-09 0022-0531 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553 We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria. eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Atribución 4.0 Internacional Best experienced payoff Procedural rationality Payoff-sampling dynamics Stability Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications info:eu-repo/semantics/article