2026-09-08T07:01:19Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/71122022-11-03T01:05:36Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832

Izquierdo, Segismundo S. Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 2022-11-02T12:52:48Z 2022-11-02T12:52:48Z 2022-10 2164-6066 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112 10.3934/jdg.2021018 2164-6074 Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence. eng info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Evolutionary game dynamics Centipede game Backwards induction Cooperation Simulation Best experienced payoff dynamics Finite population "Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game info:eu-repo/semantics/article