2026-10-13T01:21:40Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/74672024-05-10T11:55:57Zcom_10259_7380com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_7381
2023-02-28T11:18:08Z
urn:hdl:10259/7467
Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas
Andrés, Pablo de
García Rodríguez, Íñigo
Romero Merino, María Elena
Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos
Stakeholder theory
Spanish cajas
Politicians
Private benefits
Political party identification
Social identity theory
Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We
use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether
political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties,
or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is
associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors.
Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the
political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on
the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of
private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members.
2023-02-28T11:18:08Z
2023-02-28T11:18:08Z
2022-05
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
0148-2963
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7467
10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096
eng
Journal of Business Research. 2022, V. 144, p. 1272-1292
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2013-2016/ECO2017-85356-P/ES/VALOR, ESTRATEGIA FINANCIERA Y GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/CAM//SI3-PJI-2021-00276/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
Elsevier