2026-10-15T03:54:31Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/request

oai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/74672024-05-10T11:55:57Zcom_10259_7380com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_7381

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Andrés, Pablo de author García Rodríguez, Íñigo author Romero Merino, María Elena author Santamaría Mariscal, Marcos author 2022-05 Our research focuses on the private benefits of politicians as board directors of Spanish savings banks (cajas). We use hand-collected data on the political affiliation and personal loans of 1,578 directors to investigate whether political directors used private benefits through excessive personal loans, loans granted to their political parties, or the institutions they represented. Our results show that a higher proportion of political directors on a board is associated with larger personal loans and with better terms than those granted to non-political directors. Furthermore, this higher proportion is also linked to larger loans granted to the public administrations that the political directors represented on the cajas’ governing board. Finally, we also find in-group favouritism based on the social identity theory and directors’ party identification. Therefore, political directors make greater use of private benefits when allocated to their political party and its members. 0148-2963 http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7467 10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.096 Stakeholder theory Spanish cajas Politicians Private benefits Political party identification Social identity theory Stakeholder governance and private benefits: The case of politicians in Spanish cajas