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<dc:title>Board networks as a source of intellectual capital for companies</dc:title>
<dc:creator>Blanco Alcántara, David</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Díez Esteban, José María</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Romero Merino, María Elena</dc:creator>
<dc:subject>Network analysis</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Boards of directors</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Intellectual capital</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Dynamic capabilities framework</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Interlocking directorship</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>Intra-industry relationships</dc:subject>
<dc:subject>G3</dc:subject>
<dc:description>The purpose of this paper is to use the dynamic capabilities framework to explain the effect of board networks, as a source of intellectual capital, on firm performance. The authors propose that the influence of board interlocks depends on their ability to contribute to strategic decision making. As a result, their effect is subject to the business context in which they occur and the different role of the interconnected directors involved.</dc:description>
<dc:date>2024-02-08T13:09:44Z</dc:date>
<dc:date>2024-02-08T13:09:44Z</dc:date>
<dc:date>2018-10</dc:date>
<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
<dc:identifier>0025-1747</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10259/8640</dc:identifier>
<dc:identifier>10.1108/MD-12-2017-1238</dc:identifier>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:relation>Management Decision. 2019, V. 57, n. 10, p. 2653-2671</dc:relation>
<dc:relation>https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/MD-12-2017-1238/full/html#abstract</dc:relation>
<dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/</dc:rights>
<dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
<dc:rights>Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional</dc:rights>
<dc:publisher>Emerald</dc:publisher>
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