2024-03-28T14:39:29Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/39212022-04-29T12:02:47Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
00925njm 22002777a 4500
dc
Santos Martín, José Ignacio
author
Poza, David J.
author
Galán Ordax, José Manuel
author
López Paredes, Adolfo
author
2012
The topology of interactions has been proved very influential in the results of models based on
learning and evolutionary game theory. This paper is aimed at investigating the effect of structures
ranging from regular ring lattices to random networks, including small-world networks, in a
model focused on property distribution norms. The model considers a fixed and finite population
of agents who play the Nash bargaining game repeatedly. Our results show that regular networks
promote the emergence of the equity norm, while less-structured networks make possible the
appearance of fractious regimes. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the speed of adoption can
also be affected by the network structure
1026-0226
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3921
10.1155/2012/482481
Evolution of equity norms in small-world networks