2024-03-28T11:53:20Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/70082022-11-02T13:37:17Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
2022-09-22T07:30:11Z
2022-09-22T07:30:11Z
2022-09
0022-0531
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008
10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553
We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria.
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Atribución 4.0 Internacional
Best experienced payoff
Procedural rationality
Payoff-sampling dynamics
Stability
Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications
info:eu-repo/semantics/article