2024-03-28T23:23:47Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/52032022-01-30T23:42:06Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
Sandholm, William H.
Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
Evolutionary game dynamics
Best experienced payoff dynamics
Sampling dynamics
Dynamic stability
Economía
Empresas-Gestión
Economy
Industrial management
We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature.
2020-01-09T12:20:59Z
2020-01-09T12:20:59Z
2020-01
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
0022-0531
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
eng
Journal of Economic Theory. 2010. V. 185, 104957
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
application/pdf
Elsevier