2024-03-29T14:01:45Zhttps://riubu.ubu.es/oai/requestoai:riubu.ubu.es:10259/76362023-04-11T00:05:16Zcom_10259_3830com_10259_5086com_10259_2604col_10259_3832
Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
Payoff sampling
Best experienced payoff
Procedural rationality
Asymptotically stable sets
Closed under payoff sampling
We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics).
In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.
2023-04-10T11:50:39Z
2023-04-10T11:50:39Z
2023-03
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
0899-8256
http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7636
10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
eng
Games and Economic Behavior. 2023, V. 138, p. 126-142
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118906GB-I00/ES/INTERACCIONES DINAMICAS DISTRIBUIDAS: PROTOCOLOS BEST EXPERIENCED PAYOFF Y SEPARACION ENDOGENA/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/Junta de Castilla y León//CLU-2019-04//Programa estratégico Instituto BIOECOUVA/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MIU//PRX19%2F00113/
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MIU//PRX21%2F00295/
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Atribución 4.0 Internacional
Elsevier