RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices
A1 Poza, David J.
A1 Santos Martín, José Ignacio
A1 Galán Ordax, José Manuel
A1 López Paredes, Adolfo
K1 Industrial management
K1 Empresas-Gestión
AB The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent basedmodel where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. Themodel extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] modifying the assumption of globalinteraction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent’s most frequent demand.We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in whichthe system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the globalinteraction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interactionnetworks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and canlead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in theintratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of thehindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.
PB Public Library of Science
SN 1932-6203
YR 2011
FD 2011-03
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3911
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3911
LA eng
NO Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation, references TIN2008-06464-C03-02 and CSD2010-00034 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010), and by the Junta de Castilla y Leon, references VA006A009, BU034A08 and GREX251-2009
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
RD 19-abr-2024