RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
A1 Sandholm, William H.
A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Evolutionary game dynamics
K1 Best experienced payoff dynamics
K1 Sampling dynamics
K1 Dynamic stability
K1 Economía
K1 Economics
K1 Gestión de empresas
K1 Industrial management
AB We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2020
FD 2020-01
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
LA eng
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
RD 23-nov-2024