RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics A1 Sandholm, William H. A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S. A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo K1 Evolutionary game dynamics K1 Best experienced payoff dynamics K1 Sampling dynamics K1 Dynamic stability K1 Economía K1 Economy K1 Empresas-Gestión K1 Industrial management AB We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature. PB Elsevier SN 0022-0531 YR 2020 FD 2020-01 LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203 UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203 LA eng DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos RD 29-mar-2024