RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
A1 Sandholm, William H.
A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Evolutionary game theory
K1 backward induction
K1 centipede game
K1 computational algebra
K1 Economía
K1 Economics
AB We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests eachof his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy beingagainst a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff washighest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperativeplay. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stablestate is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions ofagents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game.Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.
PB Econometric Society
SN 1933-6837
YR 2019
FD 2019-11
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236
LA eng
NO U.S. National Science Foundation (Grants SES-1458992 and SES- 1728853), the U.S. Army Research Office (Grants W911NF-17-1-0134 MSN201957), Project ECO2017-83147- C2-2-P (MINECO/AEI/FEDER, UE), and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte (Grants PRX15/00362 and PRX16/00048)
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
RD 23-nov-2024