RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game A1 Sandholm, William H. A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S. A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo K1 Evolutionary game theory K1 backward induction K1 centipede game K1 computational algebra K1 Economía K1 Economy AB We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests eachof his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy beingagainst a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff washighest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperativeplay. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stablestate is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions ofagents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game.Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play. PB Econometric Society SN 1933-6837 YR 2019 FD 2019-11 LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236 UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236 LA eng NO U.S. National Science Foundation (Grants SES-1458992 and SES- 1728853), the U.S. Army Research Office (Grants W911NF-17-1-0134 MSN201957), Project ECO2017-83147- C2-2-P (MINECO/AEI/FEDER, UE), and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte (Grants PRX15/00362 and PRX16/00048) DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos RD 29-mar-2024