RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications
A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Best experienced payoff
K1 Procedural rationality
K1 Payoff-sampling dynamics
K1 Stability
K1 Matemáticas
K1 Mathematics
K1 Economía
K1 Economics
AB We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria.
PB Elsevier
SN 0022-0531
YR 2022
FD 2022-09
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008
LA eng
NO Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), is gratefully acknowledged. Luis R. Izquierdo is grateful to the Center for Control, Dynamical Systems, and Computation at UC Santa Barbara, where part of this work was done, for their hospitality.
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
RD 22-nov-2024