RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 Stability of Strict Equilibria in Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics: Simple Formulas and Applications A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S. A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo K1 Best experienced payoff K1 Procedural rationality K1 Payoff-sampling dynamics K1 Stability K1 Matemáticas K1 Mathematics K1 Economía K1 Economy AB We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria. PB Elsevier SN 0022-0531 YR 2022 FD 2022-09 LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008 UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7008 LA eng NO Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295), is gratefully acknowledged. Luis R. Izquierdo is grateful to the Center for Control, Dynamical Systems, and Computation at UC Santa Barbara, where part of this work was done, for their hospitality. DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos RD 29-mar-2024