RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article T1 "Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S. A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo K1 Evolutionary game dynamics K1 Centipede game K1 Backwards induction K1 Cooperation K1 Simulation K1 Best experienced payoff dynamics K1 Finite population K1 Matemáticas K1 Mathematics AB Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence. PB American Institute of Mathematical Sciences SN 2164-6066 YR 2022 FD 2022-10 LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112 UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112 LA eng NO Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00 / AEI/ 10.13039/501100011033), from “Junta de Castilla y León - Consejería de Educación” throughBDNS 425389, from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX18-00182,PRX19/00113), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113), is gratefully acknowledged. DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos RD 29-mar-2024