RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
A1 Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
A1 Izquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo
K1 Payoff sampling
K1 Best experienced payoff
K1 Procedural rationality
K1 Asymptotically stable sets
K1 Closed under payoff sampling
K1 Matemáticas
K1 Mathematics
K1 Economía
K1 Economy
AB We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics).In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
YR 2023
FD 2023-03
LK http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7636
UL http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7636
LA eng
NO Financial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033), from the Regional Government of Castilla y León with the EU-FEDER program (CLU-2019-04), and from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities with the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113, PRX21/00295) is gratefully acknowledged.
DS Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos
RD 26-abr-2024