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dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo, Segismundo S.
dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-02T12:52:48Z
dc.date.available2022-11-02T12:52:48Z
dc.date.issued2022-10
dc.identifier.issn2164-6066
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112
dc.description.abstractExplaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the Spanish State Research Agency (PID2020-118906GB-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033), from “Junta de Castilla y León - Consejería de Educación” through BDNS 425389, from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (PRX18-00182, PRX19/00113), and from the Fulbright Program (PRX19/00113), is gratefully acknowledged.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherAmerican Institute of Mathematical Sciencesen
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Dynamics and Games. 2022, V. 9, n. 4, p. 461-498en
dc.subjectEvolutionary game dynamicsen
dc.subjectCentipede gameen
dc.subjectBackwards inductionen
dc.subjectCooperationen
dc.subjectSimulationen
dc.subjectBest experienced payoff dynamicsen
dc.subjectFinite populationen
dc.subject.otherMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherMathematicsen
dc.title"Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede gameen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021018es
dc.identifier.doi10.3934/jdg.2021018
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118906GB-I00/ES/INTERACCIONES DINAMICAS DISTRIBUIDAS: PROTOCOLOS BEST EXPERIENCED PAYOFF Y SEPARACION ENDOGENAes
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/Junta de Castilla y León//BDNS 425389es
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PRX18%2F00182es
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICIU/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PRX19%2F00113es
dc.identifier.essn2164-6074
dc.journal.titleJournal of Dynamics and Gameses
dc.volume.number9es
dc.issue.number4es
dc.page.initial461es
dc.page.final498es
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersiones


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