Universidad de Burgos Repositorio Repositorio
Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3911

Ver estadísticas de uso
Título : Mesoscopic effects in an agent-based bargaining model in regular lattices
Autor : Poza, David J.
Santos Martín, José Ignacio
Galán Ordax, José Manuel
López Paredes, Adolfo
Publicado en: PlOS ONE. 2011, V. 6, n. 3, e17661
Editorial : Public Library of Science
Fecha de publicación : mar-2011
ISSN : 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0017661
Resumen : The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] modifying the assumption of global interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent’s most frequent demand. We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.
URI : http://hdl.handle.net/10259/3911
Versión del editor: info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/JCyL/GREX251-2009
Aparece en las colecciones: Artículos GIO

Ficheros en este ítem:

Fichero Descripción Tamaño Formato
Poza-PlosOne_2011.pdf912,24 kBAdobe PDFVisualizar/Abrir

Este ítem está sujeto a una licencia Creative Commons Licencia Creative Commons
Creative Commons

Los ítems del Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.

 

Valid XHTML 1.0! DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2008 MIT and Hewlett-Packard - Sobre DSpace