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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112

    Título
    "Test two, choose the better" leads to high cooperation in the Centipede game
    Autor
    Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
    Izquierdo Millán, Luis RodrigoAutoridad UBU Orcid
    Publicado en
    Journal of Dynamics and Games. 2022, V. 9, n. 4, p. 461-498
    Editorial
    American Institute of Mathematical Sciences
    Fecha de publicación
    2022-10
    ISSN
    2164-6066
    DOI
    10.3934/jdg.2021018
    Résumé
    Explaining cooperative experimental evidence in the Centipede game constitutes a challenge for rational game theory. Traditional analyses of Centipede based on backward induction predict uncooperative behavior. Furthermore, analyses based on learning or adaptation under the assumption that those strategies that are more successful in a population tend to spread at a higher rate usually make the same prediction. In this paper we consider an adaptation model in which agents in a finite population do adopt those strategies that turn out to be most successful, according to their own experience. However, this behavior leads to an equilibrium with high levels of cooperation and whose qualitative features are consistent with experimental evidence.
    Palabras clave
    Evolutionary game dynamics
    Centipede game
    Backwards induction
    Cooperation
    Simulation
    Best experienced payoff dynamics
    Finite population
    Materia
    Matemáticas
    Mathematics
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7112
    Versión del editor
    https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2021018
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    Izquierdo-jdg_2022.pdf
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    1.900Mo
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