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dc.contributor.authorSandholm, William H.
dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo, Segismundo S.
dc.contributor.authorIzquierdo Millán, Luis Rodrigo 
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-09T09:07:06Z
dc.date.available2020-03-09T09:07:06Z
dc.date.issued2019-11
dc.identifier.issn1933-6837
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236
dc.description.abstractWe study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.en
dc.description.sponsorshipU.S. National Science Foundation (Grants SES-1458992 and SES- 1728853), the U.S. Army Research Office (Grants W911NF-17-1-0134 MSN201957), Project ECO2017-83147- C2-2-P (MINECO/AEI/FEDER, UE), and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación, Cultura, y Deporte (Grants PRX15/00362 and PRX16/00048)es
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherEconometric Societyes
dc.relation.ispartofTheoretical Economics. 2019, V. 14, n. 4, p. 1347–1386es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/*
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryen
dc.subjectbackward inductionen
dc.subjectcentipede gameen
dc.subjectcomputational algebraen
dc.subject.otherEconomíaes
dc.subject.otherEconomicsen
dc.titleBest experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede gameen
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/view/45es
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE3565
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO/ECO2017-83147- C2-2-P
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX15/00362
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MECD/PRX16/00048
dc.journal.titleTheoretical Economicses
dc.volume.number14es
dc.issue.number4es
dc.page.initial1347es
dc.page.final1385es
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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