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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236

    Título
    Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the centipede game
    Autor
    Sandholm, William H.
    Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
    Izquierdo Millán, Luis RodrigoUBU authority Orcid
    Publicado en
    Theoretical Economics. 2019, V. 14, n. 4, p. 1347–1386
    Editorial
    Econometric Society
    Fecha de publicación
    2019-11
    ISSN
    1933-6837
    DOI
    10.3982/TE3565
    Abstract
    We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing each strategy being largely independent of the length of the game. Testing strategies many times leads to cyclical play.
    Palabras clave
    Evolutionary game theory
    backward induction
    centipede game
    computational algebra
    Materia
    Economía
    Economy
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5236
    Versión del editor
    https://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/view/45
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