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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203

    Título
    Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
    Autor
    Sandholm, William H.
    Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
    Izquierdo Millán, Luis RodrigoUBU authority Orcid
    Publicado en
    Journal of Economic Theory. 2010. V. 185, 104957
    Editorial
    Elsevier
    Fecha de publicación
    2020-01
    ISSN
    0022-0531
    DOI
    10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
    Abstract
    We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points but need not be stable. We provide a variety of sufficient conditions for stability and for instability, and illustrate their use through a range of applications from the literature.
    Palabras clave
    Evolutionary game dynamics
    Best experienced payoff dynamics
    Sampling dynamics
    Dynamic stability
    Materia
    Economía
    Economy
    Empresas-Gestión
    Industrial management
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10259/5203
    Versión del editor
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104957
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