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    Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7636

    Título
    Strategy sets closed under payoff sampling
    Autor
    Izquierdo, Segismundo S.
    Izquierdo Millán, Luis RodrigoAutoridad UBU Orcid
    Publicado en
    Games and Economic Behavior. 2023, V. 138, p. 126-142
    Editorial
    Elsevier
    Fecha de publicación
    2023-03
    ISSN
    0899-8256
    DOI
    10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
    Resumo
    We consider population games played by procedurally rational players who, when revising their current strategy, test each of their available strategies independently in a series of random matches –i.e., a battery of tests–, and then choose the strategy that performed best in this battery of tests. This revision protocol leads to the so-called payoff-sampling dynamics (aka test-all Best Experienced Payoff dynamics). In this paper we characterize the support of all the rest points of these dynamics in any game and analyze the asymptotic stability of the faces to which they belong. We do this by defining strategy sets closed under payoff sampling, and by proving that the identification of these sets can be made in terms of simple comparisons between some of the payoffs of the game.
    Palabras clave
    Payoff sampling
    Best experienced payoff
    Procedural rationality
    Asymptotically stable sets
    Closed under payoff sampling
    Materia
    Matemáticas
    Mathematics
    Economía
    Economics
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10259/7636
    Versión del editor
    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.12.006
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